

Message Text

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EXDIS

USSALTTWO

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TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-PLenary CONVERSATION,
- NOVEMBER 17, 1977 (SALT TWO-1505)

1. (JOHNSON/SHCHUKIN - BELETSKY, A-1881)

NON-CIRCUMVENTION/NON-TRANSFER

BELETSKY ARGUED FOR THE SPECIFIC APPROACH THAT THE
SOVIET UNION HAD PROPOSED, POINTING TO THEIR RECENT HIS-
TORICAL EXPERIENCE. IN RESPONSE, JOHNSON REITERATED OUR
POSITION THAT THE US SIDE FELT THAT THE MORE GENERAL
LANGUAGE COVERED ALL THE CONTINGENCIES. HE FOLLOWED THIS
UP WITH A LITTLE LECTURE ON CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ONLY THE PRESIDENT COULD
RELEASE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ANY PURPOSE AND THAT UNDER US
LAW WE COULD NOT TRANSFER NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO ANY OTHER
POWER. THE US HAD TAKEN ELABORATE STEPS, BOTH ADMINISTRA-
TIVELY AND TECHNICALLY, TO ENSURE THAT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
COULD NOT BE DETONATED WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF
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THE PRESIDENT. HE OBSERVED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, NONE OF
THESE SYSTEMS; BOMBERS, CRUISE MISSILES, OR BALLISTIC
MISSILES WERE STRATEGIC WEAPONS IF THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS
COULD NOT FIRE. BELETSKY SEEMED A LITTLE SURPRISED BY ALL
OF THIS AND DROPPED THE SUBJECT.

CRUISE MISSILE CARRIERS

SHCHUKIN SAID HE REALIZED THAT THE US WAS CONSIDERING LOADING ALCMS BOTH ON BOMBERS AND ON OTHER TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION THE US WOULD LIMIT ITS DEPLOYMENT TO NEW AIRCRAFT BUILT SPECIFICALLY FOR THAT PURPOSE.

NEW TYPES

SHCHUKIN SAID HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD TAKE SERIOUSLY HIS SUGGESTION THAT UNDER THE NEW TYPES OF ICBMS PROVISION EACH SIDE BE ALLOWED TO DEPLOY ONE NEW ICBM AS WE HAD PROPOSED FOR SLBMS. HE HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION EARLIER AT OTHER MEETINGS.

2. (PRAY - KRAMER - MIHNOVETS/BEKETOV, A-1886)

SLBM LAUNCHER VERIFICATION

BEKETOV NOTED THAT THE LANGUAGE TABLED BY THE US IN PLENARY WOULD NOT COUNT NEW SLBM LAUNCHERS WHEN THEY GO ON SEA TRIALS BECAUSE THEY WOULD NEVER HAVE CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED A MISSILE. KRAMER REPLIED THAT ARTICLE II.2 DEFINES SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND ARTICLE VI SAYS WHEN THEY COUNT. BEKETOV REPEATED THAT "CONTAINS OR LAUNCHES" IS NOT SUITABLE FOR SLBM LAUNCHERS AND THAT "DEPLOYED" IS A SECRET

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MORE PRECISE CRITERION. PRAY POINTED OUT THAT THE US FORMULATION WAS IN THE PRESENT TENSE TO AVOID ANY PAST ASSOCIATION BETWEEN A MISSILE AND A LAUNCHER TO MEET THEIR CONCERN. BEKETOV POSED THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO COUNT LAUNCHERS FOR A NEW SLBM WHEN TWO NEW MISSILES ARE BEING DEVELOPED AND TESTED; ONE WITH SINGLE RV AND THE OTHER WITH MIRVS. KRAMER EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD FIRST SEE THE MISSILES TESTED, THEN ASSOCIATE THE MISSILE WITH THE LAUNCHERS THAT CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED THE MISSILE, THEN ALL LAUNCHERS OF THAT TYPE WOULD COUNT. MIHNOVETS ADDED THAT THE DRAFT TREATY ALSO STIPULATES THAT SLBM LAUNCHERS COUNT AS SOON AS THE SUBMARINE GOES ON SEA TRIALS. BEKETOV RESPONDED THAT NEW MIRV SLBM LAUNCHERS OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED "DEPLOYED" AND COUNT WHEN THE SUBMARINE GOES ON SEA TRIALS EVEN THOUGH LAUNCHERS OF THAT TYPE ABOARD A SUBMARINE HAD NEVER CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED A MIRVED SLBM. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TYPHOON SUBMARINE WILL HAVE BEEN ON SEA TRIALS FOR AT LEAST A YEAR BEFORE THE NEW MISSILE IS READY FOR IT. THIS WOULD RESULT IN A CASE WHERE A HUNDRED LAUNCHERS COULD BE DEPLOYED WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY COUNTED USING THE US FORMULATION.

TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS

BEKETOV ASKED HOW WE WERE GOING TO HANDLE LAUNCHERS
ON SUBMARINES THAT ARE USED JUST FOR TEST AND TRAINING.
DID WE NOT HAVE ANY OF THOSE? PRAY REPLIED THAT THE US
DOES NOT HAVE ANY, AND THAT ALL OUR SUBMARINES ARE USED FOR
TEST AND TRAINING. EARLE

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